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ABSTRACT
Throughout the developing world, the increasing shortage of housing
for the urban poor and the nature of the social problems associated
with it have prompted governments to intervene through the formula-
tion of policies that try to alleviate the situation.
As a result of the scarcity of resources and of the influence of
international lenders, the approach of these policies has been an
economic one. Capital formation, generation of employment, affor-
dability, cost recovery, multiplier effects, etc. have been the key
elements in decision making.
While the merits of this approach are not ignored, this thesis deals
with housing policies from a different perspective. Giving one step
back, here the analysis is based on the interests affected by these
policies. The roles of the State, the poor, the classes and sectors
that dominate State policy-making, and of the interests involved in
the provision of housing are analized from an historic perspective
as a way to establish the relations that determine their behavior.
The overall intention is to understand the roots of the housing
shortage as a basic requirement to evaluate and formulate policies
that help to improve the situation of the poor.
Thesis Supervisor: Peter H. Smith
Title: Professor of History and Political Science.
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Introduction
The creation in 1957 of the National Housing Institute (INVA)
marked the first official step of the Honduran State in the fight to
provide housing for the urban poor. Since then, other State agencies
created for the same purpose as well as other autonomous bcdies and
even the private sector have developed policies and programs oriented
to fight the shortage of housing accentuated by the urbanization pro-
cess. International finance agencies have joined the government in
this crusade by lending substantial amounts of money to supplement
the limited Honduran resources.
Different strategies -- initially public housing, later sites-
and-services, and more recently upgrading--have been adopted, mostly
following "recommendations" by finance agencies and foreign consult-
ants, and to a lesser extent by foreign-trained Honduran professionals.
The situation, however, not only has not improved but tends to
get worse. The number of homeless and of people living under unsani-
tary conditions increases every day. The gap between housing needs
and the supply of housing by the State (and the private sector) increa
ses geometrically without any foreseeable hope to change the' trend.
This produces resentments among the poor who question if the govern-
ment has indeed a genuine interest in finding a solution to the pro-
blem.
This thesis is an attempt to understand the true objectives of
the State in the formulation of policies oriented to the provision of
housing for the poor. My contention is, that the current approach to
housing has been determined by different actors who constitute the
basis of the power of the State, and whose interests are served by
these policies. These actors are not new elements in the Honduran so-
ciety. They have been present in every major decision affecting the
political life of this country. The Honduran State is a result of
their interaction. Consequently, an understanding of the origin of
these forces, their evolution and current role in society, is a basic
consideration before planners take any action regarding housing policy
making.
The work is organized in the following way: Section I analyses
the evolution of the social structure of Honduras as a result of
changes in the economic system; Section II describes the urban struct-
ures and the spatial distribution that have resulted from this evolu-
tion; Section III analyses the evolution of the Honduran State and
gives details that illustrate the sources of its power and constraints
to that power; Section IV analyses the response of the State to the
housing shortage. Final conclusions suggest personal concerns about
this situation along with avenues for further study.
"Understanding may not bring change, but change rarely occurs
without it"
1 Gilbert, Alan, in Gilbert and Gugler Cities, Poverty, and Develop-
ment, Urbanization in the Thrid World, Oxford University Press, 1982.
I. Evolution of Honduras's Social Structure
The evolution of the social class structure of Honduras has been
conditioned by the form of economic activity, which in turn has been
influenced by external economic and political forces.
This pattern has its roots in the colonial society where class
status was determined by ownership of productive land. The aristocra-
cy (4 percent of population) was formed by Spanish-born called penin-
sulares, (Peninsulars) and criollos (Creoles) who owned huge estates
in the fertile and scarce valley lands, devoted mainly to livestock
production for the regional and local markets. These profitable enter
prises called haciendas (hacienda) had a structure that in many ways
resembled that of feudal societies. They included not only the land
but also a fixed agricultural labor force that was paid by a combina-
tion of low wages and sharecropping. This produced a special form of
dependency because the peon, (farmhand) alienated from the land, had
to rely on the patron (boss) for his subsistence.
Deprived from access to arable land, the lower class had to
occupy the mountains, the dominant geographic characteristic of Hon-
duras, where they lived in humble conditions devoted to subsistence
farming through slash-and-burn systems. Other forms of subsistence
agriculture were done by small farmers, surviving Indian communities,
and other small urban and rural communities in small holdings and/or
communal and ejidal land.
1 Ejido was (is) land owned and administered by municipalities that
individuals could use, mainly for agricultural purposes, and pass it
to their heirs, which eventually created a subdivision of it. Al-
These two agrarian forms shaped the post colonial society and
originated the agrarian structures of the present time. The lack of
adequate communications due to harsh topography prevented them from
developing an internal market for further development of agriculture.
Even an incipient production of indigo was soon-discontinued (1850)
when chemical dyeings began to be produced in Europe . Thus, cattle,
the symbol of the aristocracy continued to be the main source of
wealth. Conversely, the milpa (cornfield) became the expression of
the low class, a situation that still persists.
These inequalities became more acute during Marco Aurelio Soto's
administration (1876-1883). In an attempt to spur the development of
agriculture, Soto gave out large tracts of land with free property
titles to medium and large landowners. Peasants were urged to leave
their subsistence farms and offer their labor force in the farms of
the large landowners. This produced the institutionalization of a ru-
ral high class and the impoverishment of the rural low class2
American capital started to appear in Honduras at the end of the
XIX Century. The U.S. Civil War had accelerated industrial and com-
though ejidos entered the land market, legally, only usufructuary
rights (dominio util) could be obtained from it, not full title
(dominio plno)
1 Halliburton, Eduardo; Flores, Roberto: Desarrollo Economico, Proce-
so de Urbanizacion y Funciones Metropolitanas en Honduras. Primer
encuentro Nacional sobre Desarrollo Urbano. Instituto de Investiga-
ciones Economicas y Sociales. Universidad Nacional Autonoma de Hon-
duras, March 1978, p. 201.
2 Molina Chocano, Guillermo; Estado Liberal y Desarrollo Capitalista
en Honduras, Editorial Universitaria, Honduras, June 1982 pp. 39-
mercial development producing a boom in its economy. Wartime markets
and new laws that gave land and money to railroad builders and steel
manufacturers produced by 1865 a nascent industrial complex which would
transform the U.S. into the world's leading industrial power . This
prompted U.S. businessmen and leaders to follow the British School,
that is, to search for new markets, for which nothing seemed more pro-
mising than Latin America, long the domain of European (British) sales
2
men . This economic expansion had aso been envisioned by the American
Secretary of State James G. Blaine, who understood the strategic impor
tance of Latin America, and promoted commerce and hemispheric frater-
nity as a way to obtain political dominance and displacement of the
British.
Other influential thinkers such as Alfred Thayer Mahan had
widely publicized the idea that sea power was for the U.S. the most
important factor in the assurance of well-being, influence and import-
ance in world affairs, not only economically but mainly militarily.
Moreover, he suggested the need for foreign bases as a way to expand
its area of domination .
These dreams of power were countered by the Spanish presence in
the Caribbean. Although decadent, the Spanish empire still had do-
minance over most of the Caribbean Islands and the Philipines.
1 LaFeber, Walter; Inevitable Revolutions: The United States in
Central America, W.W. Norton & Company, New Yor London, 1983. p. 25.
2 Burns, E. Bradford; Latin America a Concise Interpretive History;
Prentice Hall, Inc., New Jersery, 1977, p. 148.
3 Pratt, Julius W.; Expansionists of 1898, Baltimore, The John Hopkins
press, 1936, pp. 12 - 33.
The blowing up of the U.S. battleship "Maine" in Havana harbor
in April 1898 prompted the declaration of the so-called Spanish-Ameri-
can War which ended four months later with the expulsion of Spain from
the Western Hemisphere. Thus, while Cuba became independent, the U.S.
became the unchallenged power in the area which resulted in its gra-
dual economic intervention in Latin America.
Although the first investments were in mining, the bulk of Ame-
rican investment began to concentrate in banana production. Three
American Corporations -- the United Fruit Company (UFCo), the Cuyamel
Fruit Company (CFCo), and the Standard Fruit Company (SFCo) -- were
created to produce banana on a large scale.
Early success in their operations led them to a gradual increase
of their investments which resulted in high levels of production. In-
vestment grew from 2 million dollars in 1897 to 9.5 in 1914, 10.4 in
1919, and 80.3 in 1929, which represented in 1929 almost 40 percent of
total American investment in Central America. Banana exports, on the
other side, grew from 0.2 million dollars in 1892 to 46 million in
1930, largely surpassing the highest value of mineral exports, 3-5
million, observed in 1926. The share by banana of total exports grew
from 26 percent in 1880 to 89 percent in 19252
1 Dozer, Donald Marquand; Latin America, an Interpretive History; Mc-
Graw-Hill Book Company, 1962, pp. 420-424.
2 Murga Frassinetti, Antonio; Economia Primaria Exportadora y Forma-
cion del Proletariado: El Caso Centroamericano. (1850-19) Es-
tudios Sociales Centroamericanos, Mayo-Agosto 1982, Ano XI, Numero
32, pp. 59 - 60.
A significant effect of the banana production on the social
structure was the appearance of the working class. The amount of work
ers in the different components of the operation -- plantations, pro-
cessing plants, railroad operation, factories, port facilities, admi-
nistration, etc. -- meant a concentration of labor force never seen
1
before: more than 22,000 workers in 1920! . They had come not only
from the rural areas of Honduras but also from the rest of Central
America and the Caribbean2 attracted by relatively high salaries.
For the first time in Honduras a labor force market was in action:
wage payment in exchange for labor.
Investments, however, were not limited to banana production.
Light industries, beers, soft drinks, ice, vegetable oil, soap, shoes,
and a bank were established to supplement the local economy and to
facilitate the companies' operations. Gradually, these industries
began to serve the public and became profitable enterprises. La
Ceiba, where they had their headquarters, became an active cosmopoli-
tan city where every citizen was in one or another way connected to
the banana companies. Thus, a small middle class attached to the
companies began to emerge. Furthermore, the whole northern coast
became a foreign-controlled enclave that systematically transformed
Honduras into a one-crop economy whose demand and production were
1 Posas, Mario; Del Cid, Rafael; La Construccion del Sector Publico y
del Estado Nacional en Honduras, Editorial Universitaria Centroame-
ricana, Costa Rica, 1981, p. 39.
2 A vivid description of the banana exploitation is given in a book
that has become a classic in this subject; Amaya Amador, Ramon,
Prision Verde, Editorial Ramon Amaya Amador, Second Edition, Hon-
duras 1979.
externally controlled, and whose profits went directly to New Orleans,
New York, and later Boston.
By 1955 the banana companies began a period of technological
renovation that resulted in massive firing of workers. Natural disas-
ters that affected the plantations and a massive strike (40,000 work-
ers) that had resulted in legal unionization moved them to reduce per-
sonnel without diminishing production. Of the 35,000 workers they had
in 1953, there were only 16,000 by 1959 . While many of them returned
to their old subsistence farming and eventually began to form the
first peasants organizations, many others remained in the area.
The coincidence of the excess of labor available in the North
coast and the industrialization initiated by Juan Manuel Galvez's
administration (1949-1954) after the hard lessson of the World Dpres-
sion encouraged the location of many industries in the area. Most
(all) of the industries of this period were oriented to the production
of light consumer goods for which substantial labor was required.
These factors together with the relative development that San Pedro
Sula had achieved, formed the basis for the increasing industrial
development of this city.
Tegucigalpa, on the other side, experienced a different form of
development. Born in 1578 as a mining town, it began to change its
economic activity and physical appearance in 1880 when it was named
capital city of Honduras. By 1954 when its last mineral was abandoned,
1 Posas, Mario; Del Cid, Rafael; op. cit. p. 96.
the level of development of government and commerce as local economic
activities was such that the impact of the withdrawal of mining as the
main source of employment was minimal. Today, the territory sector in
Tegucigalpa provides more than 70 percent of the jobs and industry 18.
Differences in the basis of economic activity of these two cities
have had important effect in the social structure. The concentration
of skilled industrial labor force in San Pedro Sula resulted in a
constant interchange of ideas and experiences which created the bonds
for social organization. By contrast, the working class in Tegucigal-
pa is rather dispersed which has hindered communication and social
integration. San Pedro Sula is today the center of the organized work
ing class and the origin of almost every form of labor movilization.
As a result of the industrialization, a migration movement to-
ward Tegucigalpa and San Pedro Sula began to take place which had im-
portant effects in the working class. While some of these migrants
could find a job in the formal sector, many others had to resort to
informal forms of work to subsist in the city. Consequently, their
views and interests were different. While the former were concerned
about wage increases, job security, social insurance, promotions,
unions, etc., the latter were worried about finding a job, obtaining a
site to build a shack, securing minimal services, etc. As a result
of this, the urban working class has not had the cohesion necessary to
become a stronger voice in the Honduran society.
Massive construction of infrastructure works, roads, hospitals,
schools, factories, port facilities, public housing, etc. has resulted
in an increase of professionals-involved in the construction sector
e.g., engineers and to a lesser degree, architects. Compulsory regis-
tration of them in the Institute of Engineers transformed then into a
powerful and influential element in public policy making. Civil en-
gineers have regularly been occupying key positions in the administra-
tion. The "Institute" has also managed to control the construction
industry through, the creation of the Construction Chamber, where all
construction companies, suppliers of construction materials, and rela-
ted activities have to be registered. Both, the Institute and the Cham
ber have had representatives in almost every board of the most impor-
tant autonomous and State agencies, especially those where substantial
construction is involved.
Modernization of the economic structure by recent military go-
vernments has resulted in the strengthtening of certain groups within
the upper and the upper-middle classes. Fiscal incentives and econo-
mic support offered by the government to develop the industrial sector
have been taken by a few members of the elite, and some aggressive im-
migrants (Arabs and Americans) that have settled in Honduras relatively
recently. Because of their foreign origin they tend to "ignore" the
problems and struggles of the lower classes. Instead, they tend to
develop relationships with the landowning classes. As a result of
this, a lot of industrialists end up getting involved with business
in agriculture which leads them to oppose agrarian reform measures.
For them, inequalities in the rural areas, have meant a constant flow
of a healthy labor force which obviously reduces its bargaining power.
This is particularly true for those industries that do not require
highly-skilled personnel.
However, in spite of its active participation in the economy,
the local bourgeoisie has not led the industrialization process but
has worked in connection with foreign investors of which they have
been minority partners. Local entrepreneurs have become a managerial
class who have been executing decisions taken abroad. 32 out of the
40 largest industries are foreign controlled . Even the banana com-
panies have recently increased their participation in the economy
through the diversification of the production and through participa-
tion in productive activities for which there was no local competi-
2tion . Consequently, the benefits fron new economic activities have
continued going to foreign accounts.
As a result of the evolution here described, Honduras has become
a country of enormous inequalities clearly reflected in the overall
distribution of the income: In 1978, while the lowest 70 percent of
the families received 36 percent of the income, the same percentage
of the income (36) was received by the'top 10 percent of the fami-
lies3 . A similar situation has been observed in the rural ares where
inequalities in land distribution have led to acute disparities in
1 Plan de Empleo 1982-1985 Secretaria Tecnica del Consejo Superior de
Planificacion Economica, Tegucigalpa.
2 For a detailed description of American Investments in Honduras,
refer to Barry Tom; Wood, Beth; Preusch, Deb; Dollars and Dictators,
a Guide to Central America, Grove Press, Inc., New- York, 1983, pp.
175 - 179.
3 "Encuesta de Ingresos y Egresos", 1978, Consejo Superior de Plani-
ficacion Economica, Tegucigalpa.
the distribution of income from agriculture. In 1976, landowners, who
represented 0.3 percent of the rural population, appropiated 26.3 per-
cent of the income while 65.3 percent of the rural population received
only 24 percent
This situation has been getting worse during the last years as a
result of an economic crisis and of the lack of redistributive mea-
sures. While economic growth was 5.6 percent per year between 1974
and 1979, it fell to 2.6 percent in 1980, 0.3 percent in 1981, and
2
seems to have been negative in 1982 . Therefore, economic growth is
not keeping up with population growth whose most conservative estimate
is 2.8 percent per year.
Consequently, we can say that the search for economic develop-
ment has been made at the expense of social development which has
deepened the underdevelopment conditions of the Honduran society. The
incipient industrialization has resulted in the creation of social
classes separated by abysmal differences. Each of these groups, has
lacked a clear definition and organization which has worked against
their own interests and against the interests of the society as a
whole. The upper class has relied on the foreign sector for its deve-
lopment; the middle class has grown unsafely attached to the dominant
groups which prevents a clear identification with any group; the work-
ing classes are still influenced by their rural roots but feel rejected
1 Montes, Mauricio; La Crisis Economica de Honduras y la Situacion de
los Trabajadores, Imprenta Calderon, September 1982, p. 53.
2 Central Bank of Honduras. Honduras en Cifras.
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by the city; the peasants ... they watch from their shacks the pros-
perity of the city and the economic improvement of the other classes
at their expense. None of these groups has taken a leading role in
society. Each one is concerned about their own problems and pay little
attention to national interest issues like social development and jus-
tice. Few people really care about the increasing social inequalities.
The consequences of this evolution are still to be seen.
II. Urbanization and the Creation of a Demand for Housing
The economic activity and the evolution of the social structure
have been reflected physically in the urban structures and in the spa-
tial occupation of the territory. The economic stagnation and class
stratification of the post-independence period, for example, resulted
in cities whose colonial appearance did not suffer noticeable changes.
Land was hierarchically distributed according to class status, deter-
mined by the proximity to the main plaza where the Church, the City
Hall, and the Governor's house were The closer to the plaza, the
higher the class. These cities, however, had substantial power thanks
to the lack of communication which produced a sense of localism and
competition among them. Since limits were not clearly defined by law,
municipal authorities tried to encompass large areas. More than a
nation, Honduras was a series of cities whose only common interest was
self protection.
The enclave form of the banana exploitation and the lack of com-
munications with the rest of the country, had important consequences
in the spatial structure. Most urban centers -- San Pedro Sula, La
Ceiba, Tela, El Progreso, La Lima, Trujillo -- were concentrated in
the North; all of them had significant importance in the operation of
the banana companies. While the north coast began to gain importance
as a result of the coming of the most capable and aggressive leaders
of the rural areas, rural areas continued to be stagnant, and living
1 Hardoy, Jorge E.; The Building of Latin America Cities, in Urbaniza-
tion in Contemporary Latinamerica; edited by Gilbert, Hardoy, and
Ramirez; 1982 John Wiley & Sons Ltd. p. 26.
was provided by subsistence farming. With the exception of Tegucigal-
pa, that captured the taxes generated by the banana exports, the eco-
nomic benefits and technological improvements brought about by the
banana exploitation did not filter to other parts of the country in a
significant degree, which produced a polarization between the North
and the Center.
Initiated by Galvez and continued by subsequent administrations,
the construction of a roads network to promote a capitalist development
had major effects on the occupation of the territory. Roads not only
served to stimulate the emergence of new economic activities but to
let the rural population discover how poor they were and how limited
were their opportunities in the farm. This led them to use these
roads to move toward cities. Not having access to land, their hopes
for improvements were almost non-existent. The fact that industria-
lization was very incipient at that time, suggests that it was the un-
fair and futureless rural life more than the attraction of the cities
what encouraged early movements toward urban areas, mainly Tegucigal-
pa and San Pedro Sula.
The construction of the Carretera del Norte (northern road) in
1951 not only connected Tegucigalpa and San Pedro Sula but encouraged
their growth and that of small towns located along the road. Expan-
sion of the network toward the ports on the Atlantic and Pacific oceans
to facilitate importing and exporting activities, contributed to the
formation of a North-South corridor of development, where most invest-
ments in economic and social infrastructure began to concentrate.
By 1976, the Corridor of Development had reached a level of de-
velopment, population, and urbanization, similar to that of a country
in a medium stage of development, which contrasted with the situation
in the rest of Honduras. Although it occupied 30.6 percent of the area
of the country, it contained 61 percent of the total population and 86
percent of the urban population. Other indicators showed it had 85
percent of the industries, 95 percent of the total electric energy
capacity, 88 percent of hospitals, 94 percent of medical doctors, and
69 percent of total paved roads. The area produced 76 percent of Gross
Domestic Product. Between 1965 to 1970 it received 90.7 percent of
1total public investment
However, the benefits of the development of this area did not
filter toward the rest of the country. The development was concentra-
ted in its 8 urban centers, mainly Tegucigalpa and San Pedro Sula.
Therefore, even the Corridor of Development was (is) not an homo-
geneous area. It had "pockets" of concentration of economic activi-
ties, and marginal areas that had not had access to the dynamic of
the area.
Thus, between 1950 and 1961, Tegucigalpa, doubled its population
from 72,385 inhabitants to 134,075, and San Pedro Sula almost tripled
2it from 21,139 to 58,632
1 Human Settlements: National Report presented by the Republic of Hon-
duras to the United Nations Conference on Human Settlements, Habitat
1976, pp. 33 - 43.
2 Avilez P., Geraldina: El Proceso de Crecimiento de los Asentamientos
Populares Urbanos de Tegucigalpa y su Relacion con las Politicas Esta
tales, Master of Social Work Thesis, Universidad Nacional Autonoma de
Honduras, 1983, p. 58.
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As a result of the massive migration movement, the structure of
the total population changed drastically. 36 percent of the population
lived in urban areas in 1982 as compared to 23 percent in 1960. (The
agency of statistics estimated as urban the population living in
centers with a minimum of 2,000 inhabitants, which at least had public
lighting, sewage network, or a health center).
Table I
Population of Honduras, 1960/1982
(thousands)
1 9 6 0 1 9 8 2
Popula- Percent- Popula- Percent- Rate of
tion. age. tion. age. Growth
I Rural 1,505 77% 2,234 64% 1.8%
II Urban 440 23% 1,277 36% 5-0%
Total 1,945 100% 3,511 100% 2.8%
Source: Central Bank of Honduras, El Modelo de Desarrollo De Honduras,
Tegucigalpa, 1983.
Although the total urban population grew at a rate of 5 percent
per year, Tegucigalpa's rate was 6 percent, which resulted in an in-
crease of its share of the urban population from 31 percent in 1960
to 38 percent in 1982, and of the total population from 7 to 14 per-
cent.
1 There does not exist an accurate estimate of the current population
of Honduras. Since the last census was taken in 1974 every agency
now makes its own estimates based on different projections. The
analysis of several figures led me to accept those by the Central
Bank as a realistic though conservative estimate of the situation.
Tegucigalpa
San Pedro Sul
Total
Table II
Population of the two Main Cities of Honduras
(thousands)
1960 1982 Rate
135 480
a _59 300
194 780
of Growth
6.0%
7.7%
Source: Central Bank of Honduras
One important consequence of the rapid growth of cities was the
proliferation of different forms of low income settlements which in
Honduras are called barrios marginales. Since 1960, the population
living in these areas has been growing at a rate of 9.3 percent per
year. As a result of this, their share of the total urban population
of Honduras grew from 17 percent in 1960 to 4.2 percent in 1982!
Table III
Distribution of Urban Population of Honduras, 1960/1982
(thousands)
1 9 6 0
Popula- Percent-
tion. age.
I "Margi-
nal. 75
II Non
"Marginal_365
Total 440
1 9 8 2
Popula- Percent-
tion. age.
531
19%
23%
15%
746
'1277
Source: Central Bank of Honduras
Rat~e of
Growth
9.3%
3.3%
Knowing that Tegucigalpa grows faster than the rest of the urban
population, and that the severity of its urban problems is higher than
in other cities, I can speculate that the rate of growth of its barrios
marginales is at least 10 percent per year, and that they contain in
minimum of 55 percent of the total population of the city. Using
these figures I can quickly estimate that every year, Tegucigalpa adds
a minimum of 26,400 people to its barrios marginales.
Even though the rate of growth of San Pedro Sula is higher than
Tegucigalpa's, the severity of the urban problems of Tegucigalpa is
higher due to the dificult topography which increases infrastructure
costs and to the shortage of water sources.
What is life like in the barrios marginales? In these areas only
34 percent of the houses have piped potable water, 22 percent have
flushing toilets, 15 percent of the families have neither toilets nor
latrines and in some "barrios" this figure is higher than 35 percent,
41 percent of the houses are of rustic wood, and more than 35 percent
of the houses have earth floors . Similar indicators for Tegucigalpa
as a whole show that 46 percent of the houses have piped water, 40 per
cent flushing toilets, 15 percent are made of rustic wood, and 28 per
cent have earth floors .
1 Gonroy, Michael E.; Kawas C., Celina; Zuniga M, Melba Luz; Ingreso,
Gasto, Barrio y Familia: Estrategias de los Pobladores de Barrios
de Ingresos Bajos en Tegucigalpa. Asesores para el Desarrollo,
ASEPADE, Tegucigalpa, June 1982.
2 Consorcio Lahmeyer - Conash. Analisis de la Situacion Socioeconomica
de Tegucigalpa y su Desarrollo. 1981.
Most people live in overcrowding conditions. One or two room
units accommodate more than 50% of the families which average 7.1
people, leading to densities of 900 persons per hectare in many areas
of the city. The relation beds-per-person is 0.670 for small families
(1 to 4 members), 0.440 for medium families (5 to 9 members), and
0.381 for large familes (10 and more members). Health conditions are
extremely precarious as a result of overcrowding, dust, and unsanitary
living conditions. Water borne diseases (gastroenteritis, colitis,
dysentery, and other water borne parasites), occupy first place (12.8
%) among causes of general mortality, and also of infant mortality
(24.2%)'.
In Tegucigalpa 79 percent of the heads of families in the "ba-
rrios marginales" are migrants. For most of them job expectations
have not materialized: only 58 percent of the heads of families have
permanent employment which produces an average monthly salary of $
2116.002. Although 32 percent of them were small farmers in their
places of origin, that expertise was a little help in a city where the
service sector provides more than 70 percent of the jobs and agricul-
3ture barely 2 percent . Their low educational level 3.3 years, has
forced them to acquire new skills to make a living in the city.
Section I suggested that the economic evolution has led to an
increase in poverty and that the State has played a major role in
1 Anuario Estadistico 1977, Direccion General de Estadisticas y Censo.
2 Conroy, Kawas, Zuniga op. cit. p. 159.
3 METROPLAN, Esquema Director de Ordenamiento Metropolitano 1975-2000
p. 16.
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determining access by the poor to economic resources,to improve their
status. Consequently, more than the economic situation, it is the
State, as allocator of resources, who determines the proportion of
those resources that will be made available to the lower class. An
understanding of the nature of the State, its standing and role in
society, its source of power and limits to it, are therefore essential
considerations for an understanding of government policies on housing
for the poor.
III. The Honduran State
The beginnings of the modern state in Honduras date from 1876
when Marco Aurelio Soto took control of the government militarily sup-
ported by Guatemala and El Salvador, and initiated a period of major
reforms. Soto and his Minister Ramon Rosa created the laws and insti-
tutional structures needed for a capitalist development. Among others,
civil, penal, criminal, mining and commercial codes were elaborated;
church property was secularized and the tithe was abolished, the post
service was restructured and a telegraphic network built; a road to
the Pacific to facilitate mining export was built; free primary edu-
cation became obligatory; the monetary system was organized; the pu-
blic debt was consolidated and special attention was given to the debt
1 2
created by a failed transoceanic railroad etc.
Since a peaceful environment was necessary for capitalist deve-
lopment Soto discontinued the customary persecution of political ene-
mies, mainly the military, and gave the first steps for the organiza-
tion of an army. He attracted the old military caudillos3 and put
them together in a "professional" army. Modern weapons, uniforms, and
1 For a detailed description of this transaction which amounted 110
million dollars by 1910, the actors involved, and the way in which
it was paid, refer to : Selser Gregorio, Los Inicios de la Diploma-
macia del Dollar: Honduras 1911-1912, Cuadernos Americanos (Mexico)
Ano XLII No. 6 Noviembre-Diciembre 1983.
2 Posas, Mario; Del Cid, Rafael; op. cit. p. 13.
3 The caudillo was the blend of the concept of indigenous cacique or
indian chieftain and the colonial concept of domination, hierarchi-
cal structure, and authoritarianism. The caudillo provided guidance,
support, and protection, to isolated communities creating a depen-
dency relationship on them. The lack of communication means in Hon-
duras encouraged localism and the proliferation of caudillos.
a military structure were furnished by the Ministry of War. Military
service for those between the ages of 18 -to 35 was institutionalized.
Military technicians who had fought in the Cuban Independence was (An-
tonio Maceo and Maximo Gomez) were brought to train the new army and to
create a military school. With this, Soto not only controlled the
caudillos but also had a repressive body to support the implementation
of his plans. He had said that "although the government would be li-
beral and tolerant, it would not hesitate to punish quickly and effec-
tively and violation, regardless of social position, family name or po-
litical background" . Indeed, he proved this in 1878 when he autori-
zed the death of former president Jose Maria Medina who attempted to
2
overthrow the government2. Thus, the military began to take shape as
a source of the power of the State.
The failure of agriculture in providing the expected revenues led
Soto to a turn to mining. The Constitution of 1880 and the Mining Code
cleared up the way for foreigners to come to Honduras and exploit mi-
ning just as if they were nationals. Among others, roads to access
the mines were built, registers of workers to assure the availability
of labor were adopted, and concessions that included free importation
of machinery and equipment and almost every form of tax exemption were
granted. This initiated a dependency on foreign capital that has cha-
racterized the Honduras State.
1 Molina Chocano, Guillermo; op. cit. p. 26.
2 Ibid, p. 24.
Of the foreign mining companies that settled in Honduras, the
Rosario Mining Company (RMCo), that had been created in New York in
1879 with Soto and his Minister Enrique Gutierrez as partners, was
the largest. That year, RMCo was granted a 20 years concession to ex-
ploit the "mineral San Juancito", which lasted until 1954! In one
year, 1887, RMCo exported 1.6 million dollars worth of mineral, equi-
valent to 87 percent of total mining export value1
Although mining produced fabulous profits to all the groups in
operation, fiscal concessions and the enclave type of exploitation pre-
vented the State from participating in the profits. The slight benefit
for the State was the generation of employment. In 1937, a year of
high profits for RMCo, it employed 1012 hoduran workers and 39 foreig-
ners who earned $1.47 per day the former and $9.22 the latter. RMCo
still operates in Honduras.
More important was the State encouragement of the banana trade.
Moved by an interest in obtaining funds to finance the State's opera-
tion, the government not only granted ample concessions and privileges
to banana companies but permitted their economic expansion at the ex-
pense of local producers who were displaced from their farms. Banana
companies were so powerful and the State so weak that the government
depended on its relationship with them to ensure its stability in
power. This statistic explains better the situation: While total ba-
nana exports between 1925 and 1950 amounted to 412.5 million dollars
for an average of 16.5 million per year, the total national budget
1 Molina Chocano, Guillermo, op. cit. p. 88.
1
for 1932 was less than .6 million
Other reasons could be added as determinants of the easy penetra
tion and take over by American banana companies. Firstly, local pro-
ducers of banana were a weak economic group who lacked influence in
the political and institutional life. Moreover, their lack of means
to transport the fruit, the rapid decaying nature of the banana, and
the smallness of the market forced them to accept the conditions im-
posed by American commercializers and to depend fully on them for the
sale of the whole production. Secondly, the hacendados, an important
component of the social and economic life were in fact not interested
in economic progress, since they were not in personal need of it.
Their haciendas contained everything they needed to maintain a life
style well above that of the rest of the population. Their affluency
allowed them to travel as much as necessary to obtain goods not avai-
lable in the local market.
The worldwide depression of the 1930s led to a decline in profits
for the companies. Many workers were fired and the government stepped
in to control tensions.
Supported by UFCo, in 1933, Tiburcio Carias Andino, a caudillo
from the conservative National Party, became President and eventually
a dictator. Through constitutional ammendments by an unfailing con-
gress and with the military support of the U.S., Carias remained in
power until 1949. His regime was one of harsh repression. Moved by an
1 Avilez P., Geraldina, op. cit. p. 47.
order-impossing interest he repressed the popular classes, prohibited
unionizations and restricted democracy. Extensive imprisonment, exile
and killing combined to destroy all form of political opposition
throughout the whole territory.
Even though Carias stopped the customary political instability
that had (has) characterized the Honduran State, the result was a
"peace" and stability of dubious merits. While other countries had
begun to build the basis for economic growth, Honduras remained eco-
nomically stagnant; the dependency situation of the State on the ba-
nana companies increased dramatically; and cooption became a rampant
practice that has ever since been a pervasive element in the political
life of Honduras. As a result of this, the political presence of UFCo
reached levels without precedents. Most public servants in the North
coast and many others in Tegucigalpa were related to UFCo and appeared
in its payroll. Its petitions in Congress were always answered fa-
vourably and fiscal benefits to UFCo subsidiaries were granted prompt-
ly. By 1940, its control over Honduras' political and economic life
was far beyond any imaginable limit.
The modernization of the State began to take place during the
Juan Manuel Galvez's administration (1949-1954). Before Galvez there
had not been a clear differentation of the State apparatus. Although
Soto had introduced important reforms, the State continued being treat
ed as a personal property, a source of private privileges and econo-
mic gains. It was the need to develop new forms of economic sustain
after the lesson of the depression what originated a period of growth
and higher differentiation of the State. New economic institutions --
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A coup of the brief dictatoial regime (1954-1956) of Julio
Lozano Dias marked the rise of the Army as an important source of power
for the State thus increasing its autonomy. This non-bloody coup is
particularly important in Honduran history. For the first time, the
army as an institution took an active political role. The army had
been gaining force since the begining of Carias's regime. Later, in
1954, coinciding with the overthrow of the liberal Guatemalan President
Jacobo Arbenz by a small group coming from Honduras and militarly led
by the U.S. , a military assistance agreement between Honduras and the
U.S. was signed. By this, the Honduran army would become a modern and
professional institution through training of its members in American
academies and in the Military School at the Panama Canal. The trium-
virate was formed by members of the old and new school. Two of them,
Hector Caraccioli and Roberto Galvez Barnes, were young officers
(around 34), trained in military academies of the U.S. The third one,
Roque J. Rivera, (55) was a member of the old guard. The army was con-
solidated.
A precedent that would guarantee the participation of the army
in the political life was created in 1957. The Liberal Party, who had
obtained a majority in the recently elected constituent assembly, re-
quested permission to the army to elect Ramon Morales as the President
of Honduras by vote of the assembly. They argued that he had proved
his leadership and sympathy among the population in the last two elec-
tions and, therefore, it was useless to invest more time and money in
1 LaFeber, Walter; op. cit. p. 125.
the Central Bank, the Agricultural Development Bank, the Ministry of
Agriculture, and the School of Economics -- were created to coordinate
the State's support for new forms of capitalist development. Today,
these institutions are the core of the economic life of Honduras.
Since communications were a major constraint for development,
Galvez gave special attention to the construction of roads to link
together the main productive centers, policy that was also followed
by subsequent administrations. Thus, out of 41.7 million dollars bor-
rowed by the government between 1955 to 1964, 73 percent was devoted
to roads
Galvez's administration was one of intense labor activity. Al-
though he did not give direct support to labor movements, neither did
he restrain the reaction occuring in Tegucigalpa and the North Coast.
More than 25,000 workers of the Tela Railroad Company (a branch of
UFCo) went on strike in May 1954 demanding better salaries, better
working and living conditions, social benefits, and the recognition of
trade unions to protect their interests. Although they obtained very
little of their demands, the strike, that was later joined by another
15,000 workers and heroically lasted 69 days, gave to the workers a
sense of gremial organization. Similarly, the workers became a poli-
2
tical force
1 Posas, Mario; Del Cid, Rafael; op. cit. p. 86
2 LaFeber, Walter; op. cit. p. 125.
new presidential elections. With minor opposition, the army agreed.
Thus, Villeda Morales became a "Constitutional" President with a
conflictive situation of power. The new constitution had given full
autonomy to the army. Its only authority would be the Head of the
Armed Forces who would be selected by the congress from a list of three
candidates proposed by the army. The President could only give orders
to the army through the Head of the Armed Forces. Differences between
them would be solved by vote of the Congress thus creating a duality
of power. The army became a political power; a State within the State.
Other than this, the new constitution was the culmination of the
capitalist development process in which the State had been committed
since 1949. The State assumed the role of a promoter of a growing and
ordered level of production, employment ard income, through 1) creating
the conditions for investment, and 2) providing the public services re-
quired for a capitalist development.
On the capital side, substantial incentives were given for local
and mainly foreign investors to develop the industrial sector: roads,
electric communications, cheap electric energy, stable currency, free
mobility of capital, tax incentives, guarantee to investments by local
and foreign capital, etc. Preferential treatment was given to those
industries that used local labor and raw materials, had a multiplier
effect, and/or would improve the balance of payments. Low-transforma-
tion industries were not encouraged. To overcome the smallness of the
market Honduras became a part of the Central American Common Market.
The Labor force supply, on the other side, was assured through
investments in housing, health, education, social security institu-
tions, and the enactment of the Labor Code and the Civil Service Law.
An agrarian reform was enacted and partially implemented.
With these elements, Villeda Morales tried to satisfy some of the
claims of the political alliance that brought him to power, to the ex-
tent that they would not overlap with each other. The emerging indus-
trial bourgeoisie received protection from the State, the urban middle
class had more sources of employment, the popular sectors obtained
some social concessions, and the army obtained the benefits of its new
political power. Political demands by the first three included acharge
of the domination by the landowning class and the commercial bourgeoi-
sie, and the widening of the social basis of power.
However, the scheme did not work as expected. The army became
a constant threat to the permanency of the State; the foreign capital
overtook the industrial sector and displaced the local bourgeoisie,
transforming them into minority partners thus increasing foreign pene-
tration and dependency 1; the participation of Honduras in the Central
America Common Market was rather poor due to its low industrialization
as compared to other countries (mainly El Salvadort and Guatemala) which
had initiated it much earlier; the Labor Code that included major
labor conquests, became a means to limit and control labor's.political
1 Evans, Peter; Dependent Development: The Alliance of Multinational,
State, and Local -Capital in Brazil; Princeton University Press,
1979, pp. 15 - 42.
power because the legal procedures to determine legality of a strike
were long and tedious, and solidarity strikes were prohibited; the
Agrarian Reform was unable to seize land owned by the banana companies
which resulted in the modification of its law ; labor mobilization
increased; and the organized peasantry emerged as a new political
force.
Meanwhile, the oligarchic groups had been conspiring against the
government. An attempt to overthrow the government in 1959 was stifled
by Villeda Morales's followers without the intervention of the army.
(A second attempt in 1961 resulted in the murder of 12 people and the
exile of its leaders). The UFCo managed to change the Agrarian Reform
Law, questioning Villeda Morales's permanency.
Consequently, the political demands of the alliance were never
quite addressed by the regime. Domination continued to be by the oli-
garchic class with the inclusion of the new element, the Army. Social
mobilization that would have led to positive benefits for the lower
classes was restrained through an anticommunist excuse thus preventing
what could have been an historical change.
Peasant mobilization started to grow at the time when political
campaigns were in process. A charismatic and aggressive liberal
leader, Modesto Rodas Alvarado, was looming up as the winner which
would have meant the continuation of the increasing popular mobiliza-
tions. However, the dominant groups did not permit this possibility
I LaFeber, Walter; op. cit. p. 168.
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to come true. A bloody coup overthrew Villeda Morales 10 days before
elections.
The consequences of the malformation of the social, political,
and economic structures generated during the colonial and independent
eras, that began to be felt during Villeda Morales' administration,
reached a climax during the militarism, an era initiated in 1963 and
still strong in present time. This was expressed not only in terms of
popular mobilization but mainly in the decadency of the political
institutions that represented them. Although new elements affected
the political scene, the power structure and its consequences persist-
ed through the period: The dominant groups continued being used both
physically and intellectually. If any progress was achieved during
this period it was at the poor's expense.
Unable to contain the political pressure emerging from the low
classes, the dominant groups resorted to the army to stop it. How-
ever, the army, first through harsh repression and later through open
alliances with personalistic politicians, managed to control the situa
tion and remain in power for more than 20 years. Their initial bad
image was erased in 1969 during the military conflict with El Salva-
dor. A brave defense of the territory with outdated equipment turned
them into national heros, which eventually led to an increase of the
budget for military spending. Civil governments during these 20 years
have not questioned the army's authority. On the contrary, approval
by the army to the actions of these governments has been their only
guarantee of their permanencec
The initial period of repression led to a deep economic crisis
that the military were not able to handle. Protests by different sec-
tors started to arise. To counter it, the army decided to form a
constitutional government for which they joined efforts with the Na-
tional party, which elected Colonel Oswaldo Lopez Arellano as President
following the electoral system of 1957 initiated by the Liberals.
This, however, did not help. The country continued going through the
crisis without any hope of stoping it.
It was the military conflict withe El Salvador in 1969 that pro-
duced unexpected political and economic effects. The bellicose situa-
tion created an environment of unification between classes and social
groups which gave full moral and physical support to the army. The
subsequent withdrawal of Honduras from the Central American Common Mar
ket, meant the closing of the market to products from the area which
help to the recovery of the local bourgeoisie.
During this difficult period, the popular sector evidenced their
political maturity and full conscience of the sources of their pro-
blems. In the midst of the economic crisis (March 1969) and thinking
of the forthcoming elections of 1971, the Confederation of Honduran
Workers made an historic appeal to the "national conscience", demanding
political reforms as a way to preserve the constitutional state. They
claimed, "we believe that the constitutional state must be preserved
and that the change of authorities must be done as prescribed by the
Constitution: through the direct and secret vote of all the citizens";
"we, the Hondurans, can and must break the vicious circle of political
instability"; we believe that it is necessary to have an understanding
between the government, the political parties, and the social forces of
this country". In order to achieve these objectives, they proposed,
among others, the following reforms: 1) The establishments of a civil
service law so that public servants would have stable jobs regardless
of political preferences; 2) elimination of the monopoly by the two
traditional parties so that new political parties and independent can-
didates for the different levels of authority could be presented; 3)
progressive tax reforms; 4) free unionization; 5) effective support
of an agrarian reform1.
This declaration initially presented in March, 1969 did not have
a good response because of the disarticulation of classes and social
groups during this period. However, it was presented again to Lopez
Arellano six months later, during the patriotic effervescence after
the conflict with El Salvador, by a strong coalition formed by several
political organizations (excluding the National Party), the largest
unions, and the Federation of Students. The private sector joined the
group a little later. Although not very enthusiastic at first, the
enormous support behind the proposal forced Lopez Arellano to sponsor
it.
Thus, the frist national coalition was formed. Its principles
were summarized in a historic document called Pacto de Unidad Nacional
(National Unity Agreement), whereby it was stated that the new govern-
ment would be one of unity, and that it would be committed to work in
the best national interest.
1 Posas, Mario; Del Cid Rafael; op. cit. p. 153.
However, once in power the politicians forgot the national inte-
rest and returned to their traditional practices: personalism and sec
tarianism. Administration of the State was divided equally between the
two historical parties according to the number of agencies. However,
the Nationalist grabbed those with the highest economic weight. This
resulted in permanent discontent among the Liberals and a high ineffi-
ciency of the administration. The new president, the jurist Ramon
Ernesto Cruz was unable to control this situation thereby creating
great disappointment among the population.
The conditions were given for a return of Lopez Arellano who was
"sharing" power as Head of the Armed Forces. He did so. A brief no-
tification finished the 18 month government of the well intentioned
Cruz. The peaceful coup produced joy among many groups and sadness
among the lower class.
Building on the recent history, Lopez Arellano initiated a new
reformist and technocratic period which revolved around the implemen-
tation of a "National Development Plan". The Plan was based on the
modernization of the socioeconomic~ structures and the rational exploi-
tation of the natural resources, mainly the'forests, as a way to have
a sustained capitalist development. This resulted in a substantial
increase of the institutional apparatus of the State and a clearer
differentiation of it.
The State decided to participate directly in the economy. New
autonomous agencies and a development corporation, "Corporacion Na-
cional de Inversiones" (CONADI) were created to generate new indus-
tries, largely through commercial foreign credits guaranteed by the
government. Owners of these industries were mainly from the landowning
class and a small growing industrial bourgeoisie. Mixed capital (State
Local, Foreign) enterprises were formed to expolit the forests. Huge
hydroelectric projects were undertaken. Even an Agrarian Reform was
initiated as an important component of the plan.
The result, however, largely differed from that which had been
planned. Investments by CONADI went mainly to projects of dubious
feasibility which resulted in a huge foreign debt at moderately high
interest rates. Mixed enterprise did not produce the expected bene-
fits. Hydroelectric projects are still under construction, absorbing
enormous amounts of money. The Agrarian Reform failed to provide land
to peasants. Thus, the expected benefits from the industrial develop-
ment that would generate social development, were not achieved.
What developed from all this was the State bureaucracy. Public
spending grew by 26 percent between 1973 to 1978. Government revenues
were insufficient to pay them so it was necessary to appeal to foreign
credits and State bonds to cover the deficit. New regressive taxes
were also applied which made the tax load grow from 11 percent of the
GDP in 1973 to 16 percent in 1978. Another important consequence was
that people continued migrating toward urban areas where most of these
industries were located. Some of them could find a job there. The
majority had to obtain employment through the informal sector.
1 Molina Chocano, Guillermo; Honduras: La Situacion Politica y Econo-
mica Reciente, in "Centroamerica mas alla de la Crisis", by Donaldo
Castillo Rivas, Ediciones SIAP, June 1983 p. 126.
Successive military governments by Juan Alberto Melgar (anti-
reformist) and Policarpo Paz Garcia were unable to handle the rapidly
deteriorating situation.
Forced by local and foreign pressure, in 1979 the military had
to provide the conditions for a return to a constitutional order. The
transition period was a long one. Two elections separated by a one-
year provisional government during which the popular class had an op-
portunity to express again their situation. Urban and rural land in-
vasions proliferated . Popular meetings and labor movilizations be-
came a part of the everyday life. Promises started to be heard every-
where. Blue, and red banners were again waving. The political game
was again in action.
This time, however, the conflictive internal situation seems to
be relegated to a second place by the political events in the Central
American area. External forces are impossing new rules for the game.
The liberal Roberto Suazo Cordoba might not be able to meet his pro-
mises .... and the poor might have to continue waiting for their vin-
dication.
1 Caldera Hilda, Las Invasiones Urbanas en Tegucigalpa, Universidad
Catolica "Andres Bello", Caracas, Venezuela 1983.
IV. State Responses to Housing
State responses to the housing shortage have been oriented to
the preservation of the system. Both, the formulation of policies and
their implementation are a reflect of the role of the forces that
constitute the power of the State, and of the practices that have limi-
ted its efficiency and autonomy. By allowing the market to act as the
main allocator of housing, the State has left the popular classes in
the hands of the dominants groups of society. By implementing its po-
licies through the State apparatous, efficiency and equity in the pro-
duction and distribution of housing have been severly limited.
State responses can be broadly divided into formal and informal
policies. Formal policies are those that are to be implemented by
the formal sector, both the public and the private. Informal policies
are a sort of laissez faire where the government recognizes its inabi-
lity to satisfy the demand and permits informal (mostly illegal) forms
of housing construction to take place.
By and large, formal policies have been oriented to the produc-
tion of housing as a commodity. They do not see the shortage of
housing as the result of the socioeconomic evolution of society but
rather as the lack of a good for which there is enormous demand and,
therefore, must be massively produced. Solutions to the "problem" are
then based on the maximization of the number of houses built by the
formal sector. For this, emphasis is given on the obtention of the
maximum amount of funds, the elaboration of efficient designs, and
the rational use of indigenous and modern construction materials.
This approach will hardly solve the housing shortage because
resources are always insufficient to meet the growing demand. What it
does is to favor the interests of the classes and coalitions that form
the economic support of the State, which are represented in the housing
industry. By allowing the problem to subsist, the States guarantees
the production of these classes.
This idea can be applied both to the production of housing and
to its distribution among the population. On the production side, the
interests involved can be divided as local and foreign. Local inte-
rests are landowners, consultant firms, construction companies, the
building materials industry, banks and savings and loan associations,
the State itself, etc. Foreign interests are the international fiance
agencies, the building materials industry, the heavy machinery indus-
try, consultants, etc.
From the allocation-of-housing point of view, it is the middle
and upper classes who have been benefited. Planning and construction
standards have been so high that the final product has been out of
reach by the lower classes. The State has largely favored the cons-
truction of detached well-finished houses for its supporters, which
at the same time contributes to its good image.
Two State Agencies have been encharged of implementation formal
policies: the National Housing Institute (INVA) created during the
early modernization period (1957), and the National Housing Finance
Agency (FINAVI) created during the military reform (1973). The dif-
ference between them is that while INVA directly executes projects
using foreign loans and government subsidies, FINAVI does it through
a system of Savings and Loans associations in a totally capitalist
fashion. As a result of this, they tend to serve to different sectors
of the market. INVA (unsuccessfully) tries to address the low income
sector and FINAVI the middle and middle-high income groups.
A third agency with a role in housing is the city authority, the
"Consejo Metropolitano del Distrito Cental" (CMDC). Its interest is
to adapt the urban structure to the best use by the capital as a way
to increase its revenues 1. In this goal, the areas occupied by barrios
marginales represented a loss.
For CMDC, housing is a problem that affects its image and ope-
ration. Firstly, they see it as problem of aesthetic. Barrios margi-
nales not only make the city look ugly and dirty but can be taken as
a reflection of their inability to run the city. Secondly, people
living in barrios marginales do not pay municipal taxes, and, there-
fore, are seen as a burden for the municipal finances. Thirdly, CMDC
has been the target of the majority of popular demands: 44.11 per-
cent 2. CMDC sees the barrios marginales as the origin of these mobi-
lizations.
As a result of the proliferation of barrios marginales, CMDC is
now encouraging housing programs as a way to contribute to the sub-
division and legal tenure of land to increase the municipal tax base.
1 Plan de Desarrollo Metropolitano, METROPLAN, Tegucigalpa.
2 Lizarra de Sossa, Beatriz G.; Los Movimientos Reivindicativos Urba-
nos en Honduras, Master of Social Work Thesis, Universidad Nacional
Autonoma de Honduras, 1982, p. 40.
Given that the main constraint for massive construction of
housing is the shortage of funds, the State has now created a new insti
tution, the "Fondo Social de la Vivierda" (FOSOVI), very much in line
with what has been done in Mexico, Guatemala and El Salvador. While
it will function as the other housing agencies, its major responsibi-
lity will be to build a fund through the deduction of a certain percent
age (around) 3 percent) of the salaries of all the formal workers.
Again, this policy will continue favoring the interests mentioned
above. This time, however, land speculation will tend to increase as
a result of higher availability of funds.
Informal policies, on the other side, have been gradually gaining
importance. Statistics show that more houses have been built through
informal forms of construction that through the public and private
sector combined. Between 1977 to 1982, for example, the formal sector
built 17,436 housing units . Housing needs due to population growth
2during this period were 76,753 units
Infortunately, informal policies also tend to favor the dominant
class. Most housing construction by the poor is done on lots pur- _
chased to large urban landowners who usually make high profits in the
operation. The desperate situation of the poor forced them to accept
lots in illegal urbanizations where basic infrastructure is not pro-
vided. Other form of exploitation is the rent of rooms in cuaterias
(tenement) where families live in overcrowding and unsanitary condi-
1 Plan Nacional de Vivienda 1982- 6 p. 3.
2 Estimated on the basis of 2.8 percent population growth, and 6 mem-
bers per family.
tions.
A new form of informal policy is to permit invasions of land,
especially, when it is public. This system has been widely used du-
1
ring electoral periods to attract popular -vote
Recently, the State has begun to adopt policies oriented to the
lowest income groups. Two factors have been decisive for this attitu-
de. On one side, military governments have looked for ways to improve
their image both locally and internationally. Dependency on the word
capitalist systems has acted like a limit to the use of force as a way
to contain popular movilization. Consequently, they try to show evi-
dence of concern about basic needs of the population. On the other
side, international finance agencies are now conditioning their asist-
ance to the adoption of certain schemes "suggested" by them. This
has been the result of the demonstrated inability of conventional
forms of housing to reach the lowest percentiles of the population.
Two strategies, "Sites-and-Services" and "Upgrading", have been
the result of this "new" attitude. "Sites-and-Services" consists of
the provision of serviced lots that the user will develop piecemeal
through progressive development systems like mutual-help and self-help,
according to their economic capacity and/or preferences. "Upgrading"
consists of the provision of basic infrastructure services to existing
settlements, usually resulting from illegal occupations.
1 Caldera, Hilda; Las Invasiones Urbanas en Tegucigalpa, Universidad
Catolica "Andres Bello", Venezuela, 1983.
However, even in these strategies, the interest to reach the
poorest groups is many time defeated by the nature of the capitalist
:1
interests involved in their development . These interests tend to be-
nefit the classes above mentioned, represented by contractors, buil-
2
ding material suppliers, real estate developers, etc. . Valorization
of lots after the implementation of upgrading programs usually result
in the displacement of users who cannot resist the increasing pressure
produced by the new market value. Consequently, the majority of the
most needy sectors of the population end up being displaced by the
middle class in spite of the claims of popular-concern by housing
agencies.
What future is there for sites-and-services and upgrading as
strategies for urban development? Although sites-and-services has
been opposed by contractors because it reduces the profits they used
to obtain in the labor-intensive conventional housing, I expect that
the government will continue supporting both strategies because they
do work in its benefits. Without demanding large per capita invest-
ment, they do address the poorest groups from which the State obtain
political support. In the case of upgrading, it helps the State to <
consolidate its ability to impose order. By building roads in squatter
areas, access by security forces needed for apeasement of volatile
1 Burgess Rod; Petty Commodity Housing or Dweller Control? A Critique
of John Turner's Views on Housing Policy, World Development, 1978,
Vol 6, No. 9/10, p. 1105 - 113,
2 Peattie, Lisa R.; Some second Thoughts on Sites-and-Services, Habi-
tat International, Vol. 5. Nos. 5/6.
1
situations is assured . For CMDC, upgrading is a fantastic way to
increase municipal revenues ... nobody gets a drop of water unless
they are registered in the cadaster.
1 Shlomo, Angel; Upgrading Slum Infrastructure, Divergent Objectives
in Search of Consensus. Third World Planning Review, Vol 5, No. 1,
Feb. 1983.
Conclusions
From the ideas presented in this work some points should be under
stood if we intend to have a role as active planners, especially in the
third world. Although many of these views have already been presented
by others, their validity seems to be reinforced in the context that I
have just analized.
Urban problems (housing and all the others) cannot be addressed
in isolation. Neither the city nor even the whole country is some-
times wide enough to frame them. In the case of Honduras, the inter-
national situation is a decisive factor in most decisions related to
them. Urban problems have to be addressed in the context of national
development which is determined by the action of political and econo-
mic forces.
It should be clear that as long as the power of the State is de-
termined by its relationships with the local dominant groups and with
foreign economic and political powers the situation of the- poor will
not improve. On the contrary it will tend to get worse every day.
By the same token, it should be clear that as long as the vicious of
the political system -- cooptation, political instability, lack of
solid political institutions, administrative corruption, lack of con-
scious and responsible politicians, large inefficient bureaucracies,
etc. -- persist, the State will encounter enormous difficulties in
carrying out its good intentions of helping the poor.
Housing has to be seen not as a problem, but as a physical mani-
festation of a socioeconomic situation created by the process of urba-
nization. Urbanization, as we have just seen, is nothing else but the
result of the evolution of social, economic, and political forces in
space. Enormous inequalities in both urban and rural areas have resul-
ted from this process. The shortage of housing is just one of the ma-
ny forms in which these inequalities are expressed. As a result of
this, it should be clear that the construction of housing projects
alone will in no way solve the shortage because it does not attack the
roots of the shortage.
A clear understanding of these ideas should help us to adopt one
out of two attitudes toward the problem: do we want to solve it, or
do we want just to palliate it. The first option means to change the
socioeconomic relationships, basis of the existing system, that have
created the problem; the second option means to look for innovative
measures to improve the existing system in order to have more arms to
attack the problem. Both positions are valid. What is important is
to know exactly what we will be doing. In the case of Honduras,
changes that affect the relationship State-foreign sector are condem-
med to failure. Changes that affect the relationship State-dominant
groups have little chances of success although they will find strong
opposition.
From the above, we, as planners should decide what our role in
society is going to be. It is very unlikely that we can change a
social structure generated during hundreds of years of economic ine-
qualities. It is even more unlikely that we can change the power
structure of the State. Therefore, if we intend to contribute effec-
tively to improve the situation of the poor we have to be ready to
face enormous obstacles. We have to "learn to live with conflict, to
accept conflict as inevitable, and to exploit conflicting forces for
constructive action", "only in this way can we ultimately hope to gain
respect for ourselves as persons as well as professionals"
1 Friedmann, John; Notes on Societal Action; Journal of the American
Institute of Planners, September 1969, p. 311 - 317.
B I B L IO G R A P H Y
Amaya Amador, Ramon, Prision Verde, Editorial "Ramon Amaya Amador.
Second Edition. Honduras, 1979.
Angel, Shlomo, Upgrading Slum Infrastructure, Divergent Objectives in
Search of a Consensus. Third World Planning Review, Vol 5, Nol 1,
February 1983.
Caldera Hilda, Las Invasiones Urbanas en Tegucigalpa, Thesis for the
degree of Sociologist, Universidad Catblica Andres Bello, Venezuela,
1983.
Conroy, Michael E.; Kawas, Maria Celina; Zuniga Melba Luz; Ingreso,
Gasto, Barrio y Familia: Estrategias de los Pobladores de los Bajos
Ingresos en Tegucigalpa, ASEPADE (Asesores para el Desarrollo); Popu-
lation Research Center of the University of Texas at Austin; financed
by U.S.A.I.D. June 1982.
LaFeber, Walter, Inevitable Revolutions, The United States in Cential
America, W.W. Norton & Company, New York London 1983.
La Planificacion y Coordinacion en el Desarrollo Integral de los Asen-
tamientos Humanos. Ponencia of icial de Honduras en el X Congreso de
COPVIDU July 1983.
Lizarraga de Sossa, Beatriz Gloria: Los Movimientos Reinvindicativos
Urbanos en Honduras, Thesis for Master of Social Work degree, Univer-
sidad Nacional Autonoma de Honduras, 1982.
Meza, Victor; Politica y Sociedad en Honduras, Editorial Guaymuras,
First Edition, 1981.
Molina Chocano, Guillermo; Estado Liberal y Desarrollo Capitalista en
Honduras, Editorial Universitaria, Universidad Nacional Autonoma de
Honduras, Second Edition, June 1982.
Montes, Mauricio; La Crisis Economica de Honduras y la Situacion de los
Trabajadores, Sindicato de Trbajadores de la Universidad Nacional Auto-
noma de Honduras, September 1982.
Oqueli, Ramon; La Viscera Entrenable, Centro de Documentacion de Hondu-
ras, CEDOH, 1983.
Plan Nacional de Desarrollo 1982-86. Government of Honduras.
Posas Mario; Del Cid, Rafael; La Construccion del Sector Publico y del
Estado Nacional en Honduras, Editorial Universitaria Centroamericana,
EDUCA, First Edition, 1981.
Primer Encuentro Nacional Sobre el Desarrollo Urbano. Instituto de In-
vestigaciones Economicas y Sociales, Universidad Nacional Autonoma de
Honduras, March 1978.
Reina Idiaquez, Jorge Arturo; Que Pasa hoy en Honduras, First Edition,
1981.
Skidmore, Thomas E., Smith, Peter H., Modern Latin America Oxford Uni-
versity Press 1984.
